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Interdisciplinary work, so much discussed these days, is not
about confronting already constituted disciplines (none of
which, in fact, is willing to let itself go). To do something in-
terdisciplinary it's not enough to choose a "subject" (a theme)
and gather around it two or three sciences. Interdisciplinarity
consists in creating a new object that belongs to no one.
ROLAND BARTl-IES, 'jeunes Chercheurs"
You'll need more tables than you think.
ELENORE SMITH BOWEN, advice for fieldworkers,
in Retu.m to Lau.ghter
Our frontispiece shows Stephen Tyler, one of this volume's
contributors, at work in India in 1963. The ethnographer is absorbed
in writing-taking dictation? fleshing out an interpretation? record-
ing an important observation? dashing off a poem? Hunched over in
the heat, he has draped a wet cloth over his glasses. His expression is
obscured. An interlocutor looks over his shoulder-with boredom?
patience? amusement? In this image the ethnographer hovers at the
edge of the frame-faceless, almost extraterrestrial, a hand that
writes. It is not the usual portrait of anthropological fieldwork. We are
more accustomed to pictures of Margaret Mead exuberantly playing
with children in Manus or questioning villagers in Bali. Participant-
observation, the classic formula for ethnographic work, leaves little
room for texts. But still, somewhere lost in his account of fieldwork
among the Mbuti pygmies-running along jungle paths, sitting up at
night singing, sleeping in a crowded leaf hut-Colin Turnbull men-
tions that he lugged around a typewriter.
In Bronislaw Malinowski's Argonauts of the Western Pacific, where a
photograph of the ethnographer's tent among Kiriwinan dwellings is
prominently displayed, there is no revelation of the tent's interior. But
in another photo, carefully posed, Malinowski recorded himself writ-
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ing at a table. (The tent flaps are pulled back; he sits in profile, and
some Trobrianders stane! outside, observing the curious rite.) This re-
markable picture was only published two years ago-a sign of our
times, not his. l We begin, not with participant-observation or with cul-
tural texts (suitable for interpretation), but with writing, the making
of texts. No longer a marginal, or occulted, dimension, writing has
emerged as central to what anthropologists do both in the field and
thereafter. The fact that it has not until recently been portrayed or
seriously discussed reflects the persistence of an ideology claiming
transparency of representation and immediacy of experience. Writ-
ing reduced to method: keeping good field notes, making accurate
maps, "writing up" results.
The essays collected here assert that this ideology has crumbled.
They see culture as composed of seriously contested codes and repre-
sentations; they assume that the poetic and the political are insepar-
able, that science is in, not above, historical and linguistic processes.
They assume that academic and literary genres interpenetrate and
that the writing of cultural descriptions is properly experimental and
ethical. Their focus on text making and rhetoric serves to highlight
the constructed, artificial nature of cultural accounts. It undermines
overly transparent modes of authority, and it draws attention to the
historical predicament of ethnography, the fact that it is always caught
up in the invention, not the representation, of cultures (Wagner
1975)· As will soon be apparent, the range of issues raised is not liter-
ary in any traditional sense. Most of the essays, while focusing on tex-
tual practices, reach beyond texts to contexts of power, resistance, in-
stitutional constraint, and innovation.
Ethnography's tradition is that of Herodotus and of Montesquieu's
Persian. It looks obliquely at all collective arrangements, distant or
nearby. It makes the familiar strange, the exotic quotidian. Ethnog-
raphy cultivates an engaged clarity like that urged by Virginia Woolf:
"Let us never cease from thinking-what is this 'civilization' in which
we find ourselves? What are these ceremonies and why should we take
part in them? What are these professions and why should we make
money (Jut of them? Where in short is it leading us, the procession of
t~le sons of educated I~len?" (1936: 62-63). Ethnography is actively
situated between powerful systems of meaning. It poses its questions at
the boundaries of civilizations, cultures, classes, races, and genders.
Ethnography decodes and recodes, telling the grounds of collective
order and diversity, inclusion and exclusion. It describes processes of
• I. ~1alin~)ws~i 19~ I: 17· The pholograph inside the tent was published in 1983 by(,corge Stockmg III l!t~t01! .oj Anthropology 1:!OJ. This volume contains other telling
scenes of ethnograplnc wntmg.
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innovation and structuration, and is itself part of these processes.
Ethnography is an emergent interdisciplinary phenomenon. Its
authority and rhetoric have spread to many fields where "culture" is
a newly problematic object of description and critique. The present
book, though beginning with fieldwork and its texts, opens onto the
wider practice of writing about, against, and among cultures. This
blurred purview includes, to name only a few developing perspec-
tives, historical ethnography (Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Natalie
Davis, Carlo Ginzburg), cultural poetics (Stephen Greenblatt), cultural
criticism (Hayden White, Edward Said, Fredric Jameson), the analysis
of implicit knowledge and everyday practices (Pierre Bourdieu, Michel
de Certeau), the critique of hegemonic structures of feeling (Raymond
Williams), the study of scientific communities (following Thomas
Kuhn), the semiotics of exotic worlds and fantastic spaces (Tzvetan
Todorov, Louis Marin), and all those studies that focus on meaning
systems, disputed traditions, or cultural artifacts.
This complex interdisciplinary area, approached here from the
starting point of a crisis in anthropology, is changing and diverse.
Thus I do not want to impose a false unity on the exploratory essays
that follow. Though sharing a general sympathy for approaches com-
bining poetics, politics, and history, they frequently disagree. Many
of the contributions fuse literary theory and ethnography. Some
probe the limits of such approaches, stressing the dangers of estheti-
cism and the constraints of institutional power. Others enthusiastically
advocate experimental forms of writing. But in their different ways
they all analyze past and present practices out of a commitment to fu-
ture possibilities. They see ethnographic writing as changing, inven-
tive: "History," in William Carlos Williams's words, "that should be a
left hand to us, as of a violinist."
"Literary" approaches have recently enjoyed some popularity
in the human sciences. In anthropology influential writers such as
Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, Claude Levi-Strauss,
Jean Duvignaud, and Edmund Leach, to mention only a few, have
shown an interest in literary theory and practice. In their quite differ-
ent ways they have blurred the boundary separating art from science.
Nor is theirs a new attraction. Malinowski's authorial identifications
(Conrad, Frazer) are well known. Margaret Mead, Edward Sapir,
and Ruth Benedict saw themselves as both anthropologists and liter-
ary artists. In Paris surrealism and professional ethnography regu-
larly exchanged both ideas and personnel. But until recently literary
influences have been held at a distance from the "rigorous" core of
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the discipline. Sapir and Benedict had, after all, to hide their poetry
from the scientific gaze of Franz Boas. And though ethnographers
have often been called novelists manque (especially those who write a
little too well), the notion that literary procedures pervade any work
of cultural representation is a recent idea in the discipline. To a grow-
ing number, however, the "literariness" of anthropology-and espe-
cially of ethnography-appears as much more than a matter of good
writing or distinctive style.2 Literary processes-metaphor, figuration,
narrative-affect the ways cultural phenomena are registered, from
the first jotted "observations," to the completed book, to the ways
these configurations "make sense" in determined acts of reading. 3
It has long been asserted that scientific anthropology is also an
"art," that ethnographies have literary qualities. We often hear that an
author writes with style, that certain descriptions are vivid or convinc-
ing (should not every accurate description be convincing?). A work is
deemed evocative or artfully composed in addition to being factual;
expressive, rhetorical functions are conceived as decorative or merely
as ways to present an objective analysis or description more effectively.
Thus the facts of the matter may be kept separate, at least in principle,
from their means of communication. But the literary or rhetorical di-
mensions of ethnography can no longer be so easily compartmental-
ized. They are active at every level of cultural science. Indeed, the very
notion of a "literary" approach to a discipline, "anthropology," is seri-
ously misleading.
The' present essays do not represent a tendency or perspective
within a coherent "anthropology" (pace Wolf 1980). The "four-field"
definition of the discipline, of which Boas was perhaps the last vir-
tuoso, included physical (or biological) anthropology, archaeology, cul-
tural (or social) anthropology, and linguistics. Few today can seriously
claim that these fields share a unified approach or object, though the
dream persists, thanks largely to institutional arrangements. The es-
says in this volume occupy a new space opened up by the disintegra-
tion of "Man" as tetos for a whole discipline, and they draw on recent
developments in the fields of textual criticism, cultural history, semio-
tics, hermeneutic philosoph)', and psychoanalysis. Some years ago, in
2. A partial list of works exploring this expanded field of the "literary" in anthro-
pology includes (not mentioning contributors to the present volume): Boon 1972 ,
197(,1982 ; Geertz 1973,1983: Turner 1974,1975: Fernandez 1974: Diamond 1974:
Duvlgnaud 1970, 1973; Favret-Saada 1980; Favret-Saada and Contreras Ig81; Dumont
1978; Tedlock 1983: Jamin 1979, 1980, 1985: Webster 1982; Thornton 1983, 1984.
3· See t?: work of I-Iayden White (1973, 1978) for a tropological theory of "pre-
figured" reahtles; also Latour and Woolgar (1979) for a view of scientific activity as
"inscription." .
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a trenchant essay, Rodney Needham surveyed the theoretical incoher-
ence, tangled roots, impossible bedfellows, and divergent specializa-
tions that seemed to be leading to academic anthropology's intellectual
disintegration. He suggested with ironic equanimity that the field
might soon be redistributed among a variety of neighboring disci-
plines. Anthropology in its present form would undergo "an irides-
cent metamorphosis" (1970: 46). The present essays are part of the
metamorphosis.
But if they are post-anthropological, they are also post-literary.
Michel Foucault (1973), Michel de Certeau (1983), and Terry Eagleton
(1983) have recently argued that "literature" itself is a transient cate-
gory. Since the seventeenth century, they suggest, Western science has
excluded certain expressive modes from its legitimate repertoire:
rhetoric (in the name of "plain," transparent signification), fiction (in
the name of fact), and subjectivity (in the name of objectivity). The
qualities eliminated from science were localized in the category of "lit-
erature." Literary texts were deemed to be metaphoric and allegori-
cal, composed of inventions rather than observed facts; they allowed a
wide latitude to the emotions, speculations, and subjective "genius" of
their authors. De Certeau notes that the fictions of literary language
were scientifically condemned (and esthetically appreciated) for lack-
ing "univocity," the purportedly unambiguous accounting of natural
science and professional history. In this schema, the discourse of liter-
ature and fiction is inherently unstable; it "plays on the stratification
of meaning; it narrates one thing in order to tell something else; it
delineates itself in a language from which it continuously draws
effects of meaning that cannot be circumscribed or checked" (1983:
128). This discourse, repeatedly banished from science, but with un-
even success, is incurably figurative and polysemous. (Whenever its
effects begin to be felt too openly, a scientific text will appear "liter-
ary"; it will seem to be using too many metaphors, to be relying on
style, evocation, and so on.) 'I
By the nineteenth century, literature had emerged as a bourgeois
institution closely allied with "culture" and "art." Raymond Williams
(1966) shows how this special, refined sensibility functioned as a kind
of court of appeals in response to the perceived dislocations and vul-
garity of industrial, class society. Literature and art were, in effect, cir-
4. "It might be objected that figurative style is not the only style, or even the only
poetic style, and that rhetoric also takes cognizance of what is called siml)l~ style. But ~n
fact this is merely a less decorated style, or rather, a style decorated m.ore sl~ply. and I~,
too, like the lyric and the epic, has its own special figures. A style III which figure IS
strictly absent does not exist," writes Gerard Genette (1982 :47)·
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cumscribed zones in which nonutilitarian, "higher" values were main-
tained. At the same time they were domains for the playing ou t of
experimental, avant-garde transgressions. Seen in this light, the ideo-
logical formations of art and culture have no essential or eternal sta-
tus. They are changing and contestable, like the special rhetoric of
"literature." The essays that follow do not, in fact, appeal to a literary
pract.ice marked off in an esthetic, creative, or humanizing domain.
They struggle, in their different ways, against the received definitions
of art., literature, science, and history. And if they somet.imes suggest
that ethnography is an "art," they return the word to an older usage-
before it had become associated with a higher or rebellious sensibil-
ity-to the eighteenth-century meaning Williams recalls: art as the
skillful fashioning of useful artifacts. The making of ethnography is
artisanal, tied to the worldly work of writing.
Ethnographic writing is determined in at least six ways: (1) con-
textually (it draws from and creates meaningful social milieux); (2)
rhet.orically (it. uses and is used by expressive conventions); (3) institu-
tionally (one writes within, and against, specific traditions, disciplines,
audiences); (4) generically (an ethnography is usually distinguishable
from a novel or a travel account); (5) politically (the authority to rep-
resent cultural realities is unequally shared and at times contested);
(6) historically (all the above conventions and constraints are chang-
ing). These determinations govern the inscription of coherent ethno-
graphic fictions.
To call ethnographies fictions may raise empiricist hackles. But
the word as commonly used in recent textual theory has lost its con-
notation of falsehood, of something merely opposed to truth. It sug-
gests the partiality of cultural and historical truths, the ways they are
systematic and exclusive. Ethnographic writings can properly be
called fictions in the sense of "something made or fashioned," the
principal burden of the word's Latin root, fingere. But it is important
to preserve the meaning not merely of making, but also of making up,
of inventing things not actually real. (Fingere, in some of its uses, im-
plied a degree of falsehood.) Interpretive social scientists have re-
cently come to view good ethnographies as "true fictions," but usually
at the cost of weakening the oxymoron, reducing it to the banal claim
that all truths are constructed. The essays collected here keep the oxy-
moron sharp. For example, Vincent Crapanzano portrays ethnog-
raphers as tricksters, promising, like Hermes, not to lie, but never un-
dertaking to tell the whole truth either. Their rhetoric empowers and
subverts their message. Other essays reinforce the po{nt by stressing
that cultural fictions are based on systematic, and contestable, exclu-
sions. These may involve silencing incongruent voices ('Two Crows
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denies it!") or deploying a consistent manner of quoting, "speaking
for," translating the reality of others. Purportedly irrelevant personal
or historical circumstances will also be excluded (one cannot tell all).
Moreover, the maker (but why only one?) of ethnographic texts can-
not avoid expressive tropes, figures, and allegories that select and im-
pose meaning as they translate it. In this view, more Nietzschean than
realist or hermeneutic, all constructed truths are made possible by
powerful "lies" of exclusion and rhetoric. Even the best ethnographic
texts-serious, true fictions-are systems, or economies, of truth.
Power and history work through them, in ways their authors cannot
fully control.
Ethnographic truths are thus inherently partial-committed and
incomplete. This point is now widely asserted-and resisted at strate-
gic points by those who fear the collapse of clear standards of verifica-
tion. But once accepted and built into ethnographic art, a rigorous
sense of partiality can be a source of representational tact. A recent
work by Richard Price, First-Time: The Historical Vision of an Afro-
American People (1983), offers a good example of self-conscious, se-
rious partiality. Price recounts the specific conditions of his fieldwork
among the Saramakas, a Maroon society of Suriname. We learn about
external and self-imposed limits to the research, about individual in-
formants, and about the construction of the final written artifact.
(The book avoids a smoothed-over, monological form, presenting it-
self as literally pieced-together, full of holes.) First-Time is evidence of
the fact that acute political and epistemological self-consciousness
need not lead to ethnographic self-absorption, or to the conclusion
that it is impossible to know anything certain about other people.
Rather, it leads to a concrete sense of why a Saramaka folktale, fea-
tured by Price, teaches that "knowledge is power, and that one must
never reveal all of what one knows" (1983: 14).
A complex technique of revelation and secrecy governs the com-
munication (reinvention) of "First-Time" knowledge, lore about the
society's crucial struggles for survival in the eighteenth century. Using
techniques of deliberate frustration, digression, and incompleteness,
old men impart their historical knowledge to younger kinsmen, pref-
erably at cock's crow, the hour before dawn. These strategies of el-
lipsis, concealment, and partial disclosure determine ethnographic
relations as much as they do the transmission of stories between gen-
erations. Price has to accept the paradoxical fact that "any Saramaka
narrative (including those told at cock's crow with the ostensible intent
of communicating knowledge) will leave out most of what the teller
knows about the incident in question. A person's knowledge is sup-
posed to grow only in small increments, and in any aspect of life
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people are deliberately told only a little bit more than the speaker
thinks they already know" (10).
It soon becomes apparent that there is no "complete" corpus of
First-Time knowledge, that no one-least of all the visiting ethnog-
rapher-can know this lore except through an open-ended series of
contingent, power-laden encounters. "It is accepted that different
Saramaka historians will have different versions, and it is up to the
listener to piece together for himself the version of an event that he,
for the time being, accepts" (28). Though Price, the scrupulous field-
worker and historian, armed with writing, has gathered a text that
surpasses in extent what individuals know or tell, it still "represents
only the tip of the iceberg that Saramakas collectively preserve about
First-Time" (25).
The ethical questions raised by forming a written archive of se-
cret, oral lore are considerable, and Price wrestles with them openly.
Part of his solution has been to undermine the completeness of his
own account (but not its seriousness) by publishing a book that is
a series of fragments. The aim is not to indicate unfortunate gaps
remaining in our knowledge of eighteenth-century Saramaka life,
but rather to present an inherently imperfect ,mode of knowledge,
which produces gaps as it fills them. Though Price himself is not free
of the desire to write a complete ethnography or history, to portray a
"whole way of life" (24), the message of partiality resonates through-
out First-Time.
Ethnographers are more and more like the Cree hunter who (the
story goes) came to Montreal to testify in court concerning the fate of
his hunting lands in the new James Bay hydroelectric scheme. He
would describe his way of life. But when administered the oath he
hesitated: "I'm not sure I can tell the truth.... I can only tell what
I know."
It is useful to recall that the witness was speaking artfully, in a
determining context of power. Since Michel Leiris's early essay of
1950 , "L'Ethnographe devant Ie colonialisme" (but why so late?), an-
thropology has had to reckon with historical determination and politi-
cal conflict in its midst. A rapid decade, from 1950 to 1960, saw the
end of empire become, a widely accepted project, if not an accom-
p.li~hed fact. Georg:s Bala~dier's "situation coloniale" was suddenly
VIsIble (1955)' Impenal relatIOns, formal and informal, were no longer
t~e accept~d rule. of the game-to be reformed piecemeal, or ironically
distanc~d m vanous wa'ys. Enduring power inequalities had clearly
constramed ethnographIC practice. This "situation" was felt earliest in
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France, largely because of the Vietnamese and Algerian conflicts and
through the writings of an ethnographically aware group of black
intellectuals and poets, the negritude movement of Aime Cesaire,
Leopold Senghor, Rene Menil, and Leon Damas. 'The pages of Pres-
ence Africaine in the early fifties offered an unusual forum for collabo-
ration between these writers and social scientists like Balandier, Leiris,
Marcel Griaule, Edmond Ortigues, and Paul Rivet. In other countries
the crise de conscience came somewhat later. One thinks of Jacques
Maquet's influential essay "Objectivity in Anthropology" (1964), Dell
Hymes's Reinventing Anthropology (1973), the work of Stanley Diamond
(1974), Bob Scholte (1971, 1972, 1978), Gerard Leclerc (1972), and
particularly of Talal Asad's collection Anthropology and the Colonial En-
counter (1973), which has stimulated much clarifying debate (Firth
et al. 1977).
In popular imagery the ethnographer has shifted from a sympa-
thetic, authoritative observer (best incarnated, perhaps, by Margaret
Mead) to the unflattering figure portrayed by Vine Deloria in Custer
Died for Your Sins (1969). Indeed, the negative portrait has sometimes
hardened into caricature-the ambitious social scientist making off
with tribal lore and giving nothing in return, imposing crude portraits
on subtle peoples, or (most recently) serving as dupe for sophisticated
informants. Such portraits are about as realistic as the earlier heroic
versions of participant-observation. Ethnographic work has indeed
been enmeshed in a world of enduring and changing power inequali-
ties, and it continues to be implicated. It enacts power relations. But
its function within these relations is complex, often ambivalent, po-
tentially counter-hegemonic.
Different rules of the game for ethnography are now emerging in
many parts of the world. An outsider studying Native American cul-
tures may expect, perhaps as a requirement for continuing research,
to testify in support of land claim litigation. And a variety of formal
restrictions are now placed on fieldwork by indigenous governments
at national and local levels. These condition in new ways what can, and
especially cannot, be said about particular peoples. A new figure has
entered the scene, the "indigenous ethnographer" (Fahim, ed. 1982;
Ohnuki-Tierney 1984). Insiders studying their own cultures offer
new angles of vision and depths of understanding. Their accounts are
empowered and restricted in unique ways. The diverse post- and neo-
colonial rules for ethnographic practice do not necessarily encourage
"better" cultural accounts. The criteria for judging a good account
have never been settled and are changing. But what' has emerged
from all these ideological shifts, rule changes, and new compromises
is the fact that a series of historical pressures have begun to reposition
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anthropology with respect to its "objects" of study. Anthropology no
longer speaks with automatic authority for others defined as unable to
speak for themselves ("primitive," "pre-literate," "without history").
Other groups can less easily be distanced in special, almost always past
or passing, times-represented as if they were not involved in the
present world systems that implicate ethnographers along with the
peoples they study. "Cultures" do not hold still for their portraits. At-
tempts to make them do so always involve simplification and exclu-
sion, selection of a temporal focus, the construction of a particular
self-other relationship, and the imposition or negotiation of a power
relationship.
The critique of colonialism in the postwar period-an under-
mining of "The West's" ability to represent other societies-has been
reinforced by an important process of theorizing about the limits of
representation itself. There is no way adequately to survey this multi-
farious critique of what Vico called the "serious poem" of cultural his-
tory. Positions proliferate: "hermeneutics," "structuralism," "history
of mentalities," "neo-Marxism," "genealogy," "post-structuralism,"
"post-modernism," "pragmatism"; also a spate of "alternate epistemol-
ogies"-feminist, ethnic, and non-Western. What is at stake, but not
always recognized, is an ongoing critique of the West's most confident,
characteristic discourses. Diverse philosophies may implicitly have this
critical stance in common. For example, Jacques Derrida's unraveling
of logocentrism, from the Greeks to Freud, and Walter J. Ong's quite
different diagnosis of the consequences of literacy share an overarch-
ing rejection of the institutionalized ways one large group of human-
ity has for millennia construed its world. New historical studies of he-
gemonic patterns of thought (Marxist, Annaliste, Foucaultian) have
in common with recent styles of textual criticism (semiotic, reader-
response, post-structural) the conviction that what appears as "real"
in history, the social sciences, the arts, even in common sense, is
always analyzable as a restrictive and expressive set of social codes
and conventions. Hermeneutic phiiosophy in its varying styles, from
Wilhelm Dilthey and Paul Ricoeur to Heidegger, reminds us that the
simplest cultural accounts are intentional creations, that interpret-
ers constantly construct themselves through the others they study.
The twentieth-century sciences of "language," from Ferdinand de
Saussure and Roman Jacobson to Benjamin Lee Whorf, Sapir, and
Wittgenstein, have made inescapable the systematic and situational
verbal structures that determine all represen'tations of reality. Finally,
the return .of rh~toric to an important place in many fields of study (it
had for mlllenma been at the core of Western education) has made
possible a detailed anatomy of conventional expressive modes. Allied
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with semiotics and discourse analysis, the new rhetoric is concerned
~ith what Kenneth Burke called "strategies for the encompassing of
situations" (1969: 3). It is less about how to speak well than about how
to speak at all, and to act meaningfully, in the world of public cultural
symbols.
The impact of these critiques is beginning to be felt in ethnogra-
phy's sense of its own development. Noncelebratory histories are be-
coming common. The new histories try to avoid charting the discov-
ery of some current wisdom (origins of the culture concept, and so
forth); and they are suspicious of promoting and demoting intellec-
tual precursors in order to confirm a particular paradigm. (For the
latter approach, see Harris 1968 and Evans-Pritchard 1981). Rather,
the new histories treat anthropological ideas as enmeshed in local
practices and institutional constraints, as contingent and often "politi-
cal" solutions to cultural problems. They construe science as a social
process. They stress the historical discontinuities, as well as continui-
ties, of past and present practices, as often as not making present
knowledge seem temporary, in motion. The authority of a scientific
discipline, in this kind of historical account, will always be mediated by
the claims of rhetoric and power."
Another major impact of the accumulating political/theoretical
critique of anthropology may be briefly summarized as a rejection of
"visualism." Ong (1967, 1977), among others, has studied ways in
which the senses are hierarchically ordered in different cultures and
epochs. He argues that the truth of vision in Western, literate cultures
has predominated over the evidences of sound and interlocution, of
touch, smell, and taste. (Mary Pratt has observed that references to
odor, very prominent in travel writing, are virtually absent from eth-
nographies.) 6 The predominant metaphors in anthropological re-
search have been participant-observation, data collection, and cultural
description, all of which presuppose a standpoint outside-looking
at, objectifying, or, somewhat closer, "reading," a given reality. Ong's
5. I exclude from this category the various histories of "anthropological" ideas,
which must always have a Whiggish cast. I include the strong historicism of George
Stocking, which often has the effect of questioning disciplinary genealogies (for ex-
ample, 1968: 6g-go). The work of Terry Clark on the institutionalization of social sci-
ence (lg73) and of Foucault on the sociopolitical constitution of "discursive formations"
.(lg73) points in the direction I am indicating. See also: Hartog (lg80), Duchet (lg71),
many works by De Certeau (e.g., 1980), Boon (lg82), Rupp-Eisenreich (lg84), and the
yearly volume History ofAnthropology, edited by Stocking, whose approach goes well be-
yond the history of ideas or theory. An allied approach can be found in recent social
studies of science research: e.g., Knorr-Cetina (lg81), Latour (lg84), Knorr-Cetina and
Mulkay (1983).
6. An observation by Pratt at the Santa Fe seminar. The relative inattention to
sound is beginning to be corrected in recent ethnographic writing (e.g., Feld 1982).
For examples of work unusually attentive to the sensorium, see Stoller (lg84a, b).
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work has been mobilized as a critique of ethnography by Johannes
Fabian (1983), who explores the consequences of positing cultural
facts as things observed, rather than, for example, heard, invented in
dialogue, or transcribed. Following Frances Yates (1966), he argues
that the taxonomic imagination in the West is strongly visualist in
nature, constituting cultures as if they were theaters of memory, or
spatialized arrays.
In a related polemic against "Orientalism" Edward Said (1978)
identifies persistent tropes by which Europeans and Americans have
visualized Eastern and Arab cultures. The Orient functions as a the-
ater, a stage on which a performance is repeated, to be seen from a
privileged standpoint. (Barthes [1977] locates a similar "perspective"
in the emerging bourgeois esthetics of Diderot.) For Said, the Orient
is "textualized"; its multiple, divergent stories and existential predica-
ments are coherently woven as a body of signs susceptible of virtuoso
reading. This Orient, occulted and fragile, is brought lovingly to light,
salvaged in the work of the outside scholar. The effect of domination
in such spatialltemporal deployments (not limited, of course, to Ori-
entalism proper) is that they confer on the other a discrete identity,
while also providing the knowing observer with a standpoint from
which to see without being seen, to read without interruption.
Once cultures are no longer prefigured visually-as objects, the-
aters, texts-it becomes possible to think of a cultural poetics that is
an interplay of voices, of positioned utterances. In a discursive rather
than a visual paradigm, the dominant metaphors for ethnography
shift away from the observing eye and toward expressive speech (and
gesture). The writer's "voice" pervades and situates the analysis, and
objective, distancing rhetoric is renounced. Renato Rosaldo has re-
cently argued, and exemplified, these points (1984, 1985). Other
changes of textual enactment are urged by Stephen Tyler in this vol-
ume. (See also Tedlock 1983,) The evocative, performative clements
of ethnography are legitimated. And the crucial poetic problem for
a discursive ethnography becomes how "to achieve by written means
what speech creates, and to do it without simply imitating speech"
(Tyler 1984c; 25). From another angle we notice how much has been
said, in criticism and praise, of the ethnographic gaze. But what of the
ethnographic ear? This is what Nathaniel Tarn is getting at in an inter-,
view, speaking of his experience as a tricultural French/Englishman
endlessly becoming an American.
It may be the ethnographer or the anthropologist again having his ears wider
open to what he considers the exotic as opposed to the familiar, but I still feel
I'm discovering something new in the use of language here almost every day.
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I'm getting new expressions almost every day, as if the language were growing
from every conceivable shoot. (1975: 9)
An interest in the discursive aspects of cultural representation
draws attention not to the interpretation of cultural "texts" but to
their relations of production. Divergent styles of writing are, with
varying degrees of success, grappling with these new orders of com-
plexity-different rules and possibilities within the horizon of a his-
torical moment. The main experimental trends have been reviewed in
detail elsewhere (Marcus and Cushman 1982; Clifford 1983a). It is
enough to mention here the general trend toward a specification of dis-
courses in ethnography: who speaks? who writes? when and where?
with or to whom? under what institutional and historical constraints?
Since Malinowski's time, the "method" of participant-observation
has enacted a delicate balance of subjectivity and objectivity. The eth-
nographer's personal experiences, especially those of participation
and empathy, are recognized as central to the research process, but
they are firmly restrained by the impersonal standards of observation
and "objective" distance. In classical ethnographies the voice of the
author was always manifest, but the conventions of textual presenta-
tion and reading forbade too close a connection between authorial
style and the reality represented. Though we discern immediately the
distinctive accent of Margaret Mead, Raymond Firth, or Paul Radin,
we still cannot refer to Samoans as "Meadian" or call Tikopia a "Firth-
ian" culture as freely as we speak of Dickensian or Flaubertian worlds.
The subjectivity of the author is separated from the objective referent
of the text. At best, the author's personal voice is seen as a style in the
weak sense: a tone, or embellishment of the facts. Moreover, the ac-
tual field experience of the ethnographer is presented only in very
stylized ways (the "arrival stories" discussed below by Mary Pratt, for
example). States of serious confusion, violent feelings or acts, censor-
ships, important failures, changes of course, and excessive pleasures
are excluded from the published account.
In the sixties this set of expository conventions cracked. Ethnog-
raphers began to write about their field experience in ways that dis-
turbed the prevailing subjective/objective balance. There had been
earlier disturbances, but they were kept marginal: Leiris's aberrant
L'Afrique fantOme (1934); Tristes Tropiques (whose strongest impact out-
side France came only after 1960); and Elenore Smith Bowen's impor-
tant Return to Laughter (1954). That Laura Bohannan in ~he early
sixties had to disguise herself as Bowen, and her fieldwork narra-
tive as a "novel," is symptomatic. But things were changing rapidly,
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and others-Georges Balandier (L'Afrique ambiguif 1957), David
Maybury-Lewis (The Savage and the Innocent 1965), Jean Briggs (Never
in Anger 197o),jean-Paul Dumont (The Headman and 11978), and Paul
Rabinow (Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco 1977)-were soon writing
"factually" under their own names. The publication of Malinowski's
Mailu and Trobriand diaries (1967) publicly upset the applecart.
Henceforth an implicit mark of interrogation was placed beside any
overly confident and consistent ethnographic voice. What desires and
confusions was it smoothing over? How was its "objectivity" textually
constructed? 7
A subgenre of ethnographic writing emerged, the self-reflexive
"fieldwork account." Variously sophisticated and naive, confessional
and analytic, these accounts provide an important forum for the dis-
cussion of a wide range of issues, epistemological, existential, and po-
litical. The discourse of the cultural analyst can no longer be simply
that of the "experienced" observer, describing and interpreting cus-
tom. Ethnographic experience and the participant-observation ideal
are shown to be problematic. Different textual strategies are at-
tempted. For example, the first person singular (never banned from
ethnographies, which were always personal in stylized ways) is de-
ployed according to new conventions. With the "fieldwork account"
the rhetoric of experienced objectivity yields to that of the autobiogra-
phy and the ironic self-portrait. (See Beaujour 1980, Lejeune 1975.)
The ethnographer, a character in a fiction, is at center stage. He or
she can speak of previously "irrelevant" topics: violence and desire,
confusions, struggles and economic transactions with informants.
These matters (long discussed informally within the discipline) have
moved away from the margins of ethnography, to be seen as constitu-
tive, inescapable (Honigman 1976).
Some reflexive accounts have worked to specify the discourse of
informants, as well as that of the ethnographer, by staging dialogues
or narrating interpersonal confrontations (Lacoste-Dujardin 1977,
Crapanzano 1980, Dwyer 1982, Shostak 1981, Mernissi 1984). These
fictions of dialogue have the effect of transforming the "cultural" text
(a ritual, an institution, a life history, or any unit of typical behavior to
be described or interpreted) into a speaking subject, who sees as well
as is seen, who evades, argues, probes back. In this view of ethnogra-
phy the proper referent of any account is not a represented "world";
now it is specific instances of discourse. But the principle of dialogical
textual production goes well beyond the more or less artful presenta-
7. I have explored the relation of personal sul~jectivity and authoritative cultural
accounts, seen as mutually reinforcing fictions, in an essay on Malinowski and Conrad
(Clifford 19!)5a).
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tion of "actual" encounters. It locates cultural interpretations in many
sorts of reciprocal contexts, and it obliges writers to find diverse ways
of rendering negotiated realities as multisubjective, power-laden, and
incongruent. In this view, "culture" is always relational, an inscription
of communicative processes that exist, historically, between subjects in
relations of power (Dwyer 1977, Tedlock 1979).
Dialogical modes are not, in principle, autobiographical; they
need not lead to hyper self-consciousness or self-absorption. As
Bakhtin (lg81) has shown, dialogical processes proliferate in any
complexly represented discursive space (that of an ethnography, or,
in his case, a realist novel). Many voices clamor for expression. Poly-
vocality was restrained and orchestrated in traditional ethnographies
by giving to one voice a pervasive authorial function and to others the
role of sources, "informants," to be quoted or paraphrased. Once dia-
logism and polyphony are recognized as modes of textual production,
monophonic authority is questioned, revealed to be characteristic of
a science that has claimed to represent cultures. The tendency to spec-
ify discourses-historically and intersubjectively-recasts this au-
thority, and in the process alters the questions we put to cultural de-
scriptions. Two recent examples must suffice. The first involves the
voices and readings of Native Americans, the second those of women.
James Walker is widely known for his classic monograph The
Sun Dance and Other Ceremonies of the Oglala Division of the Teton Sioux
(1917). It is a carefully observed and documented work of interpre-
tation. But our reading of it must now be complemented-and al-
tered-by an extraordinary glimpse of its "makings." Three titles
have now appeared in a four-volume edition of documents he col-
lected while a physician and ethnographer on the Pine Ridge Sioux
Reservation between 18g6 and 1914. The first (Walker, Lakota Belief
and Ritual1g82a, edited by Raymond DeMallie and Elaine Jahner) is a
collage of notes, interviews, texts, and essay fragments written or
spoken by Walker and numerous Oglala collaborators. This volume
lists more than thirty "authorities," and wherever possible each contri-
bution is marked with the name of its enunciator, writer, or tran-
scriber. These individuals are not ethnographic "informants." Lakota
Belief is a collaborative work of documentation, edited in a manner
that gives equal rhetorical weight to diverse renditions of tradition.
Walker's own descriptions and glosses are fragments among fragments.
The ethnographer worked closely with interpreters Charles and
Richard Nines, and with Thomas Tyon and George Sword, both of
whom composed extended essays in Old Lakota. These have now
been translated and published for the first time. In a long section of
Lakota Belief Tyon presents explanations he obtained from a number
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of Pine Ridge shamans; and it is revealing to see questions of beli~f
(for example the crucial and elusive quality of "wakan") interpreted m
differing, idiosyncratic styles. The result is a version of culture in pro-
cess that resists any final summation. In Lakota Belief the editors pro-
vide biographical details on Walker, with hints about the individual
sources of the writings in his collection, brought together from the
Colorado Historical Society, the American Museum of Natural His-
tory, and the American Philosophical Society.
The second volume to have appeared is Lakota Society (1982b),
which assembles documents roughly relating to aspects of social orga-
nization, as well as concepts of time and history. The inclusion of ex-
tensive Winter Counts (Lakota annals) and personal recollections of
historical events confirms recent tendencies to question overly clear
distinctions between peoples "with" and "without" history (Rosaldo
1980; Price 1983). Volume three is Lakota Myth (1983)' And the last
will contain the translated writings of George Sword. Sword was an
Oglala warrior, later a judge of the Court of Indian Offenses at Pine
Ridge. With Walker's encouragement, he wrote a detailed vernacular
record of customary life, covering myth, ritual, warfare and games,
complemented by an autobiography.
Taken together, these works offer an unusual, multiply articula-
ted record of Lakota life at a crucial moment in its history-a three-
volume anthology of ad hoc interpretations and transcriptions by
more than a score of individuals occupying a spectrum of positions
with respect to "tradition," plus an elaborated view of the ensemble by
a well-placed Oglala writer. It becomes possible to assess critically the
synthesis Walker made of these diverse materials. When complete, the
five volumes (including The Sun Dance) will constitute an expanded
(dispersed, not total) text representing a particular moment of eth-
nographic production (not "Lakota culture"). It is this expanded text,
rather than Walker's monograph, that we must now learn to read.
Such an ensemble opens up new meanings and desires in an on-
going cultural poesis. The decision to publish these texts was provoked
by requests to the Colorado Historical Society from community mem-
bers at Pine Ridge, where copies were needed in Oglala history
classes. For other readers the "Walker Collection" offers different
lessons, providing, among other things, a mock-up for an ethno-
poetics with history (and individuals) in it. One has difficulty giving
these materials (many of which are very beautiful) the timeless, imper-
sonal identity of, say, "Sioux myth." Moreover, the question of who
writes (performs? transcribes? translates? edits?) cultural statements is
inescapable in an expanded text of this sort. Here the ethnographer
no longer holds unquestioned rights of salvage: the authority long as-
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sociated with bringing elusive, "disappearing" oral lore into legible
textual form. It is unclear whether James Walker (or anyone) can ap-
pear as author of these writings. Such lack of clarity is a sign of the
times.
Western texts conventionally come with authors attached. Thus it
is perhaps inevitable that Lakota Belief, Lakota Society, and Lakota Myth
should be published under Walker's name. But as ethnography's com-
plex, plural poesis becomes more apparent-and politically charged-
conventions begin, in small ways, to slip. Walker's work may be an un-
usual case of textual collaboration. But it helps us see behind the
scenes. Once "informants" begin to be considered as co-authors, and
the ethnographer as scribe and archivist as well as interpreting ob-
server, we can ask new, critical questions of all ethnographies. How-
ever monological, dialogical, or polyphonic their form, they are hier-
archical arrangements of discourses.
A second example of the specification of discourses concerns gen-
der. I shall first touch on ways in which it can impinge on the reading
of ethnographic texts and then explore how the exclusion of feminist
perspectives from the present volume limits and focuses its discur-
sive standpoint. My first example, of the many possible, is Godfrey
Lienhardt's Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka (1961),
surely among the most finely argued ethnographies in recent anthro-
pological literature. Its phenomenological rendition of Dinka senses
of the self, of time, space, and "the Powers" is unparalleled. Thus it
comes as a shock to recognize that Lienhardt's portrayal concerns, al-
most exclusively, the experience of Dinka men. When speaking of
"the Dinka" he mayor may not be extending the point to women. We
often cannot know from the published text. The examples he chooses
are, in any case, overwhelmingly centered on males. A rapid perusal
of the book's introductory chapter on Dinka and their cattle confirms
the point. Only once is a woman's view mentioned, and it is in affirma-
tion of men's relation to cows, saying nothing of how women experi-
ence cattle. This observation introduces an equivocation in passages
such as "Dinka often interpret accidents or coincidences as acts of Di-
vinity distinguishing truth from falsehood by signs which appear to
men" (p. 47). The intended sense of the word "men" is certainly ge-
neric, yet surrounded exclusively by examples from male experience
it slides toward a gendered meaning. (Do signs appear to women? in
significantly different ways?) Terms such as "the Dinka," or "Dinka,"
used throughout the book, become similarly equivocal.
The point is not to convict Lienhardt of duplicity; his book specifies
gender to an unusual extent. What emerges, instead, are the history
and politics that intervene in our reading. British academics of a cer-
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tain caste and era say "men" when they mean "people" more often
than do other groups, a cultural and historical context that is now less
invisible than it once was. The partiality of gender in question here
was not at issue when the book was published in 1961. If it were,
Lienhardt would have directly addressed the problem, as more recent
ethnographers now feel obliged to (for example, Meigs 1984: xix).
One did not read "The Religion of the Dinka" then as one now must,
as the religion of Dinka men and only perhaps Dinka women. Our
task is to think historically about Lienhardt's text and its possible read-
ings, including our own, as we read.
Systematic doubts about gender in cultural representation have
become widespread only in the past decade or so, in certain milieux,
under pressure of feminism. A great many portrayals of "cultural"
truths now appear to reflect male domains of experience. (And there
are, of course, inverse, though much less common cases: for example,
Mead's work, which often focused on female domains and generalized
on this basis about the culture as a whole.) In recognizing such biases,
however, it is well to recall that our own "full" versions will themselves
inevitably appear partial; and if many cultural portrayals now seem
more limited than they once did, this is an index of the contingency
and historical movement of all readings. No one reads from a neutral
or final position. This rather obvious caution is often violated in new
accounts that purport to set the record straight or to fill a gap in "our"
knowledge.
When is a gap in knowledge perceived, and by whom? Where do
"problems" come from? 8 It is obviously more than a simple matter oE
noticing an error, bias, or omission. I have chosen examples (Walker
and Lienhardt) that underline the role of political and historical fac-
tors in the discovery of discursive partiality. The epistemology this im-
plies cannot be reconciled with a notion of cumulative scientific prog-
ress, and the partiality at stake is stronger than the normal scientific
dictates that we study problems piecemeal, that we must not over-
generalize, that the best picture is built up by an accretion of rigorous
evidence. Cultures are not scientific "objects" (assuming such things
exist, even in the natural sciences). Culture, and our views of "it," are
produced historically, and are actively contested. There is no whole
picture that can be "filled in," since the perception and filling of a gap
lead to the awareness of other gaps. If women's experience has been
significantly excluded from ethnographic accounts, the recognition or
this absence, and its correction in many recent studies, now highlights
8. "The stork didn't bring them!" (David Schneider, in conversation). Foucault de-
scribed his approach as a "history of problematics" (1984).
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the fact that men's experience (as gendered subjects, not cultural
types-"Dinka" or "Trobrianders") is itself largely unstudied. As ca-
nonical topics like "kinship" come under critical scrutiny (Needham
1974; Schneider 1972, 1984), new problems cOlicerning "sexuality"
are made visible. And so forth without end. It is evident that we know
more about the Trobriand Islanders than was known in 1900. But the
"we" requires historical identification. (Talal Asad argues in this vol-
ume that the fact that this knowledge is routinely inscribed in certain
"strong" languages is not scientifically neutral.) If "culture" is not an
object to be described, neither is it a unified corpus of symbols and
meanings that can be definitively interpreted. Culture is contested,
temporal, and emergent. Representation and explanation-both by
insiders and outsiders-is implicated in this emergence. The specifi-
cation of discourses I have been tracing is thus more than a matter of
making carefully limited claims. It is thoroughly historicist and self-
reflexive.
In this spirit, let me turn to the present volume. Everyone will be
able to think of individuals or perspectives that should have been in-
cluded. The volume's focus limits it in ways its authors and editors can
only begin to make apparent. Readers may note that its anthropologi-
cal bias neglects photography, film, performance theory, documen-
tary art, the nonfiction novel, "the new journalism," oral history, and
various forms of sociology. The book gives relatively little attention to
new ethnographic possibilities emerging from non-Western experi-
ence and from feminist theory and politics. Let me dwell on this last
exclusion, for it concerns an especially strong intellectual and moral
influence in the university milieux from which these essays have
sprung. Thus its absence cries out for comment. (But by addressing
this one exclusion I do not mean to imply that it offers any privileged
standpoint from which to perceive the partiality of the book.) Feminist
theorizing is obviously of great potential significance for rethinking
ethnographic writing. It debates the historical, political construction
of identities and self/other relations, and it probes the gendered posi-
tions that make all accounts of, or by, other people inescapably par-
tia1.9 Why, then, are there no essays in this book written from pri-
marily feminist standpoints?
9. Many of the themes I have been stressing above are supported by recent femi-
nist work. Some theorists have problematized all totalizing, Archimedian perspectives
(Jehlen 1981). Many have seriously rethought the social construction of relationship
and difference (Chodorow 1978, Rich 1976, Keller 1985). Much feminist practice
questions the strict separation of subjective and objective, emphasizing processual
modes of knowledge, closely connecting personal, political, and representational pro-
cesses. Other strands deepen the critique of visually based modes of surveillance and
portrayal, linking them to domination and masculine desire (Mulvey 1975, Kuhn
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The volume was planned as the publication of a seminar limited
by its sponsoring body to ten participants. It was institutionally de-
fined as an "advanced seminar," and its organizers, George Marcus
and myself, accepted this format without serious question. We de-
cided to invite people doing "advanced" work on our topic, by which
we understood people who had already contributed significantly to
the analysis of ethnographic textual form. For the sake of coherence,
we located the seminar within, and at the boundaries of, the discipline
of anthropology. We invited participants well known for their recent
contributions to the opening up of ethnographic writing possibilities,
or whom we knew to be well along on research relevant to our focus.
The seminar was small and its formation ad hoc, reflecting our spe-
cific personal and intellectual networks, our limited knowledge of ap-
propriate work in progress. (I shall not go into individual personali-
ties, friendships, and so forth, though they are clearly relevant.)
Planning the seminar, we were confronted by what seemed to
us an obvious-important and regrettable-fact. Feminism had not
contributed much to the theoretical analysis of ethnographies as
texts. Where women had made textual innovations (Bowen 1954,
Briggs 1970, Favret-Saada 1980, 1981) they had not done so on femi-
nist grounds. A few quite recent works (Shostak 1981, Cesara 1982,
Mernissi 1984) had reflected in their form feminist claims about sub-
jectivity, relationality, and female experience, but these same textual
forms were shared by other, nonfeminist, experimental works. More-
over, their authors did not seem conversant with the rhetorical and
textual theory that we wanted to bring to bear on ethnography. Our
focus was thus on textual theory as well as on textual form: a defen-
sible, productive focus.
Within this focus we could not draw on any developed debates
generated by feminism on ethnographic textual practices. A few very
initial indications (for example, Atkinson 1982; Roberts, ed. 1981)
were all that had been published. And the situation has not changed
dramatically since. Feminism clearly has contributed to anthropologi-
cal theory. And various female ethnographers, like Annette Weiner
(1976), are actively rewriting the masculinist canon. But feminist eth-
1982). Narrative forms of representation are analyzed with regard to the gendered
positions they reenact (de Lauretis 1984). Some feminist writing has worked to politi-
cize and subvert all natural essences and identities, including "femininity" and "woman"
(Wittig 1975, lrigaray 1977, Russ 1975, Haraway 1985). "Anthropological" categories
such as nature and culture, public and private, sex and gender have been brought into
question (Ortner 1974, MacCormack and Strathern 1980, Rosaldo and Lamphere
1974, Rosaldo 1980, Rubin 1975)·
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nography has focused either on setting the record straight about
women or on revising anthropological categories (for example, the
nature/culture opposition). It has not produced either unconven-
tional forms of writing or a developed reflection on ethnographic tex-
tuality as such.
The reasons for this general situation need careful exploration,
and this is not the place for it. tO In the case of our seminar and vol-
ume, by stressing textual form and by privileging textual theory,
we focused the topic in ways that excluded certain forms of ethno-
graphic innovation. This fact emerged in the seminar discussions,
during which it became clear that concrete institutional forces-ten-
ure patterns, canons, the influence of disciplinary authorities, global
inequalities of power-could not be evaded. From this perspective, is-
sues of content in ethnography (the exclusion and inclusion of differ-
ent experiences in the anthropological archive, the rewriting of estab-
lished traditions) became directly relevant. And this is where feminist
and non-Western writings have made their greatest impact. II Clearly
our sharp separation of form from content-and our fetishizing of
form-was, and is, contestable. It is a bias that may well be implicit in
modernist "textualism." (Most of us at the seminar, excluding Stephen
Tyler, were not yet thoroughly "post-modern"!)
We see these things better, of course, now that the deed is done,
the book finished. But even early on, in Santa Fe, intense discussions
turned on the exclusion of several important perspectives and what to
do about them. As editors, we decided not to try and "fill out" the vol-
ume by seeking additional essays. This seemed to be tokenism and to
reflect an aspiration to false completeness. Our response to the prob-
lem of excluded standpoints has been to leave them blatant. The
present volume remains a limited intervention, with no aspiration to
be comprehensive or to cover the territory. It sheds a strong, partial
light.
10. Marilyn Strathern's unpublished essay "Dislodging a World View" (1984), also
discussed by Paul Rabinow in this volume, begins the investigation. A fuller analysis is
being worked out by Deborah Gordon in a dissertation for the History of Consciousness
program, University of California, Santa Cruz. I am indebted to conversations with her.
11. It may generally be true that groups long excluded from positions of institu-
tional power, like women or people of color, have less concrete freedom to indulge in
textual experimentations. To write in an unorthodox way, Paul Rabinow suggests in this
volume, one must first have tenure. In specific contexts a preoccupation with self-
reflexivity and style may be an index of privileged estheticism. For if one does not have
to worry about the exclusion or true representation of one's experience, one is freer to
undermine ways of telling, to focus on form over content. But I am uneasy with a gen-
eral notion that privileged discourse indulges in esthetic or epistemological subtleties,
whereas marginal discourse "tells it like it is." The reverse is too often the case. (See
Michael Fischer's essay in this volume.)
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A major consequence of the historical and theoretical move-
ments traced" in this Introduction has been to dislodge the ground
from which persons and groups securely represent others. A concep-
tual shift, "tectonic" in its implications, has taken place. We ground
things, now, on a moving earth. There is no longer any ?lace of ove~­
view (mountaintop) from which to map human ways ofhfe, no Archl-
median point from which to represent the world. Mountains ar~ in
constant motion. So are islands: for one cannot occupy, unambIgu-
ously, a bounded cultural world from which to journey out and ana-
lyze other cultures. Human ways of life increasingly influence, domi-
nate, parody, translate, and subvert one another. Cultural analysis is
always enmeshed in global movements of difference and power. How-
ever one defines it, and the phrase is here used loosely, a "world sys-
tem" now links the planet's societies in a common historical process. 12
A number of the essays that follow grapple with this predicament.
Their emphases differ. How, George Marcus asks, can ethnography-
at home or abroad-define its object of study in ways that permit de-
tailed, local, contextual analysis and simultaneously the portrayal of
global implicating fiJrces? Accepted textual strategies for defining cul-
tural domains, separating micro and macro levels, are no longer ade-
quate to the challenge. He explores new writing possibilities that blur
the distinction between anthropology and sociology, subverting an un-
productive division of labor. Talal Asad also confronts the systematic
interconnection of the planet's societies. But he finds persistent, gla-
cial inequalities imposing all-too-coherent forms on the world's diver-
sity and firmly positioning any ethnographic practice. "Translations"
of culture, however subtle or inventive in textual form, take place
within relations of "weak" and "strong" languages that govern the in-
ternational flow of knowledge. Ethnography is still very much a one-
way street. Michael Fischer's essay suggests that notions of global
hegemony may miss the reflexive, inventive dimensions of ethnicity
and cultural contact. (And in a similar vein, my own contribution
treats all narratives of lost authenticity and vanishing diversity as self-
confirming allegories, until proven otherwise.) Fischer locates ethno-
graphic writing in a syncretic world of ethnicity rather than a world of
discrete cultures and traditions. Post-modernism, in his analysis, is
more than a literary, philosophical, or artistic trend. It is a general
.12. T~le t~rm is, of course, ~alle~stein's (1976). I find, however, his strong sense of
a ullltary du"ect!on to the global hlstoncal process problematic, and agree with Ortner's
reservatIons (1984: 142-43).
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condition of multicultural life demanding new forms of inventiveness
and subtlety from a fully reflexive ethnography.
Ethnography in the service of anthropology once looked out at
clearly defined others, defined as primitive, or tribal, or non-Western,
or pre-literate, or nonhistorical-the list, if extended, soon becomes
incoherent. Now ethnography encounters others in relation to itself,
while seeing itself as other. Thus an "ethnographic" perspective is
being deployed in diverse and novel circumstances. Renato Rosaldo
probes the way its rhetoric has been appropriated by social history
and how this makes visible certain disturbing assumptions that have
empowered fieldwork. The ethnographer's distinctively intimate, in-
quisitive perspective turns up in history, literature, advertising, and
many other unlikely places. The science of the exotic is being "repatri-
ated" (Fischer and Marcus 1986).
Ethnography's traditional vocation of cultural criticism (Mon:-
taigne's "On Cannibals," Montesquieu's Persian Letters) has reemerged
with new explicitness and vigor. Anthropological fieldworkers can
now realign their work with pioneers like Henry Mayhew in the nine-
teenth century and, more recently, with the Chicago school of urban
sociology (Lloyd Warner, William F. Whyte, Robert Park). Sociological
description of everyday practices has recently been complicated by
ethnomethodology (Leiter 1980): the work of Harold Garfinkel,
Harvey Sacks, and Aaron Cicourel (also neglected in the present vol-
ume) reflects a crisis in sociology similar to that in anthropology.
Meanwhile a different rapprochement between anthropological and
sociological ethnography has been taking place under the influence of
Marxist cultural theory at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary
Cultural Studies (Stuart Hall, Paul Willis). In America fieldworkers
are turning their attention to laboratory biologists and physicists
(Latour and Woolgar 1979, Traweek 1982), to American "kinship"
(Schneider 1980), to the dynastic rich (Marcus 1983), to truckers
(Agar 1985), to psychiatric clients (Estroff 1985), to ne~ urban com-
munities (Krieger 1983), to problematic traditional identities (BIu
1980). This is only the beginning of a growing list.
What is at stake is more than anthropological methods being de-
ployed at home, or studying new groups (Nader 1969). Ethnography
is moving into areas long occupied by sociology, the novel, or avant-
garde cultural critique (Clifford 1981), rediscovering otherness and
difference within the cultures of the West. It has become clear that
every version of an "other," wherever found, is also the construction
of a "self," and the making of ethnographic texts, as Michael Fischer,
Vincent Crapanzano, and others in this volume show, has always in-
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volved a process of "self-fashioning" (Greenblatt 1980). Cultural
poesi5-and politics-is the constant rec~nstitution ?f se~ves and
others through specific exclusions, conventIOns, and dIscurSIve prac-
tices. The essays that follow provide tools for the analysis of these pro-
cesses, at home and abroad.
These essays do not prophesy. Taken as a whole, they portray his-
torical constraints on the making of ethnographies, as well as areas of
textual experiment and emergence. Talal Asad's tone is sober, pre-
occupied (like Paul Rabinow) with institutional limits on interpre-
tive freedom. George Marcus and Michael Fischer explore concrete
examples of alternative writing. Stephen Tyler evokes what does
not (cannot?) yet exist, but must be imagined-or, better, sounded.
Many of the essays (especially those of Renato Rosaldo, Vincent
Crapanzano, Mary Pratt, and Talal Asad) are occupied with critical
ground clearing-dislodging canons to make space for alternatives.
Rabinow identifies a new canon, post-modernism. Other essays (Tyler
on oral and performative modes, my own treatment of allegory) re-
capture old rhetorics and projects for use now. "For use now!" Charles
Olson's poetic rule should guide the reading of these essays: they are
responses to a current, changing situation, interventions rather than
positions. To place this volume in a historical conjuncture, as I have
tried to do here, is to reveal the moving ground on which it stands,
and to do so without benefit of a master narrative of historical develop-
ment that can offer a coherent direction, or future, for ethnography. 13
One launches a controversial collection like this with some trepi-
dation, hoping it will be seriously engaged-not simply rejected, for
example, as another attack on science or an incitement to relativism.
Rejections of this kind should at least make clear why close analysis of
one of the principal things ethnographers do-that is, write-should
not be central to evaluation of the results of scientific research. The
authors in this volume do not suggest that one cultural account is as
good as any other. If they espoused so trivial and self-refuting a rela-
tivism, they would not have gone to the trouble of writing detailed,
committed, critical studies.
Other, more subtle, objections have recently been raised to the lit-
erary, theoretical reflexivity represented here. Textual, epistemo-
13. My notion of historicism owes a great deal to the recent work of Fredric
Jameson (1980, Ig81, Ig84a, b). I am not, however, persuaded by the master narrative
(a global sequence of modes of production) he invokes from time to time as an alter-
native to post-modern fragmentation (the sense that history is composed of various
local narrativ~s). ~he parti~lity I have ?ee~ ur~i?g in tl~is.in~roduction always presup-
~os.es a local hls~,on~al pre~ltcame~t. ThIS hlstonclst partiality IS not the unsituated "par-
tIality and flux WIth whIch Rabmow (see P.252) taxes a somewhat rigidly defined
"post-modernism."
Introduction
logical questions are sometimes thought to be paralyzing, abstract,
dangerously solipsistic-in short, a barrier to the task of writing
"grounded" or "unified" cultural and historical studies. 1'1 In practice,
however, such questions do not necessarily inhibit those who entertain
them from producing truthful, realistic accounts. All of the essays col-
lected here point toward new, better modes of writing. One need not
agree with their particular standards to take seriously the fact that in
ethnography, as in literary and historical studies, what counts as "real-
ist" is now a matter of both theoretical debate and practical experi-
mentation.
The writing and reading of ethnography are overdetermined by
forces ultimately beyond the control of either an author or an in-
terpretive community. These contingencies-of language, rhetoric,
power, and history-must now be openly confronted in the process of
writing. They can no longer be evaded. But the confrontation raises
thorny problems ofverification: how are the tru ths 0 f cultural accounts
evaluated? Who has the authority to separate science from art? realism
from fantasy? knowledge from ideology? Of course such separations
will continue to be maintained, and redrawn; but their changing poetic
and political grounds will be less easily ignored. In cultural studies at
least, we can no longer know the whole truth, or even claim to approach
it. The rigorous partiality I have been stressing here may be a source of
pessimism for some readers. But is there not a liberation, too, in recog-
nizing that no one can write about others any longer as if they were
discrete objects or texts? And may not the vision of a complex, prob-
lematic, partial ethnography lead, not to its abandonment, but to more
subtle, concrete ways of writing and reading, to new conceptions of
culture as interactive and historical? Most ofthe essays in this volume,
for all their trenchant critiques, are optimistic about ethnographic writ-
ing. The problems they raise are incitements, not barriers.
These essays will be accused of having gone too far: poetry will
again be banned from the city, power from the halls of science. And
extreme self-consciousness certainly has its dangers-of irony, of elit-
ism, of solipsism, of putting the whole world in quotation marks. But I
trust that readers who signal these dangers will do so (like some of the
essays below) after they have confronted the changing history, rheto-
ric, and politics of established representational forms. In the wake of
semiotics, post-structuralism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction there
has been considerable talk about a return to plain speaking and to re-
alism. But to return to realism one must first have left it! Moreover, to
14· The response is frequently expressed informally. It appears in different forms
in Randall (1984), Rosen (1984), Ortner (1984: 143), Pullum (1984), and Darnton
(1985),
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recognize the poetic dimensions of ethnography does not require that
one give up facts and accurate accounting for the supposed free play
of poetry. "Poetry" is not limited to romantic or modernist subjectiv-
ism: it can be historical, precise, objective. And of course it is just as
conventional and institutionally determined as "prose." Ethnography
is hybrid textual activity: it traverses genres and disciplines. The es-
says in this volume do not claim ethnography is "only literature."
They do insist it is always writing.
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with Paul Rabinow at the University of California at Berkeley and Santa Cruz, many of
my ideas On these topics have been agreeably assaulted. My special thanks to him and to
the students in those classes. At Santa Cruz, Deborah Gordon, Donna Haraway, and
Ruth Frankenberg have helped me with this essay, and I have had important encour-
agement and stimulus from Hayden White and the members of the Research Group on
Colonial Discourse. Various press readers made important suggestions, particularly
Barbara Babcock. George Marcus, who got the whole project rolling, has been an in-
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